On 12 September 2003, I announced the Government’s response to the recommendations
of the HIH Royal Commission. Since then considerable progress has been made
in implementing these recommendations.
Royal Commission recommendations, have now been completed.
was appointed to look at issues associated with insurance like products provided
by institutions not regulated by APRA (Recommendation 42). Mr Potts examined
the nature and extent of discretionary mutual funds (DMFs) and direct offshore
foreign insurers (DOFIs) operations in Australia and their contribution to overall
insurance capacity.
I am releasing today the Review recommendations and a summary of the Review.
The Government will be implementing the recommendations contained in the Potts
Review. The Review undertook extensive consultation with industry and those
involved will appreciate that the commercial sensitivity of some material discussed
with Mr Potts and contained in the Review prevents me from releasing it in its
entirety.
was appointed to consider the merits of introducing a limited explicit guarantee
into parts of the Australian financial system and the appropriate design features
of any such guarantee scheme (Recommendation 61). I am today releasing this
Report in full.
not contain recommendations. Rather, it presents a technical discussion of the
costs and benefits of any limited guarantee scheme. It outlines also the issues
that would need to be considered in designing any limited scheme to suit Australia’s
circumstances. While interested parties were invited to bring relevant material
to the attention of the Study, the process to date has generally involved targeted
groups.
will now conduct a broader consultation process before making a final decision
on this matter. To help facilitate the consultation process, today I am also
releasing a Government discussion paper outlining the key issues and questions
on which the Government is seeking public comment.
prudential framework suggests we would have the capacity to implement a well-designed
scheme to suit Australia’s circumstances.
costs may outweigh the benefits. The Government believes that a decision cannot
be made without a clear understanding of the model we might implement in Australia,
if, indeed, we chose to do so.
the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure)
Bill (CLERP 9). The CLERP 9 Bill passed through the House of Representatives
Winter Parliamentary sittings. The HIH Royal Commission also made a number of
recommendations that related to issues that are the responsibility of independent
bodies. In September 2003, I referred these recommendations to the relevant
bodies for their consideration. All have now responded to me in relation to
these recommendations.
There are also a number of recommendations which would require State and Territory
Government action to implement.
Commission is attached.
Industry (Supervision) Act 1993. The review examines the operation of compensation
arrangements for superannuation losses arising from fraudulent conduct and theft.
HIH Royal Commission recommendations
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Response to date
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1 (proposes review of the Corporations
Act 2001 (Corporations Act), the relevant accounting standards and
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Listing Rules relating to directors’
remuneration).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to the ASX for its consideration.
The Government’s CLERP 9 Bill will amend the Corporations Act relating
to the disclosure of director and executive remuneration and the payment
of termination benefits to directors.
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2 (proposes the Corporations Act be
changed to impose duties based on functions rather than status (for example,
director or officer)).
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The Government’s CLERP 9 Bill will correct
anomalies in the current legislation relating to the definition of ‘officer’.
The Government has referred outstanding matters to the Corporations and
Markets Advisory Committee to undertake a wider review clarifying the
classes of personnel to which both the general duties (in Chapter 2D)
and other specific duties in the Corporations Act apply.
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3 (proposes that the Government broaden
the membership of the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) to
include non-accountants).
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Current legislation already permits the appointment
of non-accountants to the AASB. In addition, the Government consulted
the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) regarding this recommendation. The
FRC, which appoints members to the AASB, recommends that the selection
criterion that candidates have relevant accounting knowledge and experience
be retained.
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4 (proposes that Australia participate
in the development of international accounting standards).
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This recommendation is being implemented through
Australia’s adoption of international accounting standards. The
FRC’s decision that Australia work towards adopting international
standards for financial periods beginning on or after 1January 2005 has
been endorsed by the Government.
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5 (proposes Australia reserve the right
to require more stringent accounting standards that are not inconsistent
with relevant international standards).
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This recommendation reflects the current situation.
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6 (proposes that the AASB alter its
Urgent Issues Group (UIG) or create a separate group to promptly issue
binding rules on the interpretation/application of accounting standards;
and that this group include lawyers and users of financial statements).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to the FRC and AASB for consideration. Importantly, the AASB noted that
the UIG membership is not restricted to accountants and presently includes
user representation.
The AASB noted that the benefits of adopting International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) Standards will be eroded if rival interpretations
are developed and issued by national interpretive bodies. The only body
that can issue authoritative interpretations of IASB Standards is the
International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee.
Under the Government’s CLERP 9 Bill, a Financial Reporting Panel
(FRP) will be established to resolve disputes between companies and the
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) on the application
of accounting standards on a case-by-case basis. It is not proposed that
the FRP’s remit cover the issuing of binding interpretations.
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7 (proposes that the accounting bodies
encourage their members to consult independent third parties or the UIG
when there is disagreement with company management about the interpretation
or application of accounting standards).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to the FRC and the AASB for consideration. Importantly, the AASB noted
this recommendation is inconsistent with the UIG charter, which does not
allow it to give guidance on resolving accounting issues that are specific
to the circumstances of a particular reporting entity. The AASB suggested
it may be necessary to establish a separate panel to provide such guidance.
The professional accounting bodies support this function being given
to the FRP.
The CLERP 9 Bill is framed so that the obligation to determine the application
of accounting standards in particular situations remains primarily with
directors and other members of company management.
There are no restrictions on those responsible for preparing accounts
to consult with third parties if appropriate.
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8 (proposes amendments to accounting
standard AASB1023 Financial Reporting of General Insurance Activities
to correct a number of deficiencies that were identified in the standard).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to the AASB for consideration.
The AASB is in the process of amending AASB 1023 consistent with this
recommendation and in conjunction with the adoption of international accounting
standards.
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9 (proposes a standard of independence
for auditors be contained in legislation and professional standards).
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The Government’s CLERP 9 Bill will require
auditors to meet a general standard of auditor independence. The standard
in the CLERP9Bill and that in the professional standards are broadly
consistent.
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10 (proposes that the Corporations
Act be amended to require the board to provide a statement in the annual
report that identifies all non-audit services provided by the audit firm
and the fees applicable to each item of work, explaining why those non-audit
services do not compromise audit independence).
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The Government will implement this recommendation
in the CLERP9 Bill.
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11 (proposed that the CLERP 9 proposal
for a ‘waiting period’ of 2 years before a former partner
directly involved in the audit of a client can become a director or senior
manager of the client, be extended).
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This recommendation will be implemented, in
part, in the Government’s CLERP 9 Bill.
Following consultations, the CLERP 9 Bill provides for a 2 year cooling
off period to apply to a former partner of an audit firm directly involved
in the audit of a client before that person can join the client as a director
or in a senior management position. The CLERP 9 Bill also applies the
2 year cooling off period to a director and lead or review auditor of
an audit company who was directly involved in the audit of the audit client.
The CLERP 9 Bill does not apply a cooling off period to partners not
directly involved in the audit of the audit client.
The prohibition on more than one former partner being a director or senior
member of the audit client is contained in the CLERP 9 Bill.
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12 (proposes that the CLERP 9 proposal
for rotation of the lead engagement partner and review partner be extended
to key senior audit personnel).
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The Government’s CLERP 9 Bill will implement
this recommendation by requiring mandatory rotation of the lead and review
partners of a listed company after 5consecutive years with a 2 year cooling
off period before a person who has played a significant role in the audit
can be reassigned to that client.
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13 (proposed amendments to the Corporations
Act to require changes to the content of the audit report, such as the
inclusion of disclosure of alternative accounting treatments and significant
matters, the inclusion of an audited operating and financial review in
the annual report, and to require audit reports to be presented in plain
English).
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These requirements are better suited for inclusion
in the auditing standards rather than being prescribed in legislation.
The Government referred this recommendation to the Auditing & Assurance
Standards Board (AuASB) for consideration. The AuASB considers that detailed
disclosure of alternative accounting treatments that could be adopted
by an entity for a particular transaction or event, by the auditor in
the auditor’s report, is likely to be confusing to users of the
financial report.
In relation to requiring disclosure in the auditor’s report about
significant matters arising in the audit process, auditors are required
under Australian Auditing Standard AUS 710 Communication with Management
on Matters Arising from an Audit to consider communicating significant
matters about the audit, or as identified from audit procedures performed,
to appropriate levels of management.
With regard to disclosures about subsequent events, this is addressed
in AASB 1002 Events Occurring After Reporting Date, while the auditor’s
responsibilities are stated in AUS 706 Subsequent Events.
The CLERP 9 Bill requires an operating and financial review be prepared
as part of the Directors’ Report.
In relation to ensuring audit reports are presented in plain English,
the AuASB has released a Guidance Note which looks to promote plain English
audit reports.
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14 (proposes that the Corporations
Act be amended to require listed companies to include a brief summary
of the nature and scope of the audit services provided by their auditor
each year).
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This requirement is better suited for inclusion
in the auditing standards rather than being prescribed in legislation.
The Government referred this recommendation to the AuASB for its consideration.
The AuASB issued an Audit and Assurance Alert in May 2002, which provides
details about the type of, and the format for, making additional voluntary
disclosures regarding the type and nature of any non-audit or other services
provided to an audit client, which are additional to the existing disclosure
requirements.
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15 (proposes that both the Australian
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and the Institute of Actuaries
of Australia (IAA) introduce compulsory certification of the completeness
and accuracy of data).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to APRA and the IAA for consideration.
In its recent discussion paper, ‘Prudential Supervision of General
Insurance – Stage 2 Reforms,’ APRA sought the views of industry
on its proposal to extend the annual Board declaration to incorporate
these matters.
APRA is currently reviewing comments it has received
from industry and the IAA in response to this proposal.
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16 (proposes that the IAA and APRA
introduce a requirement for more detailed disclosure of the exercise,
incidence and impact of subjective judgement and departure from historical
experience).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to APRA and the IAA for consideration.
Prudential standards already require more detailed disclosure in the
circumstances to which the recommendation refers.
However, APRA is consulting with the IAA on whether IAA professional
standards and guidance could also set out such requirements.
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17 (proposes that APRA extend the qualifications
of the Approved Actuary to require that they not be an employee or partner
of the organisation to which the Approved Auditor belongs).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to APRA and the IAA for consideration.
In its discussion paper, ‘Prudential Supervision of General Insurance
– Stage 2 Reforms’, APRA sought the views of industry on the
proposal that independence of actuaries and auditors be promoted by prudential
standards prohibiting the appointment of an Approved Actuary and Approved
Auditor from the same, or a related, firm.
APRA is currently reviewing comments it has received from industry in
response to this proposal.
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18 (proposes changed governance arrangements
for APRA, including replacing the non-executive board with an executive
group comprising a CEO and 2-3commissioners).
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The Government progressed amendments to the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (APRA Act)
last year to implement an enhanced governance structure from 1 July 2003.
The new members commenced on 1 July 2003.
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19 (proposes that the APRA Act be amended
to provide the Chair with the power to establish an Advisory Board).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to APRA for its consideration.
APRA is currently conducting a review of options in response to this
recommendation and has had discussions with overseas prudential regulators
on their arrangements with Advisory Boards.
The APRA Act already allows APRA to engage external advisers and consultants.
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20 (proposes that the direct involvement
of representatives of ASIC and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) in
the governance of APRA be discontinued).
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The Government progressed amendments
to the APRAAct last year to give effect to this recommendation.
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21 (proposes that the APRA Chair urgently
instigate a review of APRA’s organisational structure, balancing
its cross-sectoral responsibilities with accountability and knowledge
of financial services).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to APRA for action.
APRA members have been reviewing APRA’s organisational structure
and will shortly announce revised arrangements.
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22 (proposes that the Commonwealth
Government consider removing the requirement for the Treasurer’s
agreement to operational decisions involving APRA’s prudential oversight
of general insurers).
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The Government has accepted the policy intent
of this recommendation and will remove the requirement for APRA to seek
the Treasurer’s agreement to make operational decisions that do
not involve wider policy issues. The implementation of this recommendation
is currently being examined by the Treasury. It is proposed that any necessary
legislative amendments will be included in a proposed Financial Sector
Legislation Amendment Bill.
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HIH Royal Commission recommendations
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Response to date
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23 (proposes that the Government review
the inconsistencies between the legislative provisions for merit review
under the Insurance Act 1973 and the Banking Act 1959).
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The Government has accepted this recommendation.
The implementation of this recommendation is currently being examined
by the Treasury. It is expected that any necessary legislative amendments
will be included in a proposed Financial Sector Legislation Amendment
Bill.
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24, 26, 27 and 28 (propose that APRA
build the skills of staff involved in the supervision of general insurers,
develop a more sceptical approach to supervision, review supervisory processes
and continually question staff assumptions, views and conclusions about
the financial viability of supervised entities).
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The Government announced in the 2004-05 Budget
an increase in APRA’s funding of $47.4 million over 4years. This
follows an increase of $21.9 million over 4years announced in the 2003-04
Budget. APRA’s funding is reviewed each year in the Budget context.
The increased funding will enable APRA to further build up staff levels
in front-line supervision and specialist risk areas. It will also enable
APRA to strengthen and establish dedicated teams of front-line supervisors
to carry out supervision in respect of large groups, and strengthen its
capacity to supervise large, complex and systemically important financial
institutions.
In addition, APRA is continuing to introduce, test and refine programmes
designed to build and strengthen the capacity of its staff to supervise
and regulate general insurers. A specialist Insurance Risk team has been
recruited with significant experience in general insurance and reinsurance.
In recent months, some experienced insurance sector people have been recruited
into front-line supervisory roles.
APRA also continues to consider and assess enhancements to prudential
standards and reporting requirements. It has also implemented a more sophisticated
risk-rating system (PAIRS and SOARS), which helps provide APRA with early
identification of issues that may require attention.
Treasury and APRA are also considering aspects of APRA’s legal
infrastructure.
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25 (proposes that the Government adopt
a three-year rolling fund arrangement to set APRA’s budget).
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The Government already sets APRA’s funding
for a 4year period through the Budget process. This provides an annual
opportunity (but not an obligation) to consider whether, in light of recent
happenings,APRA’s funding should be altered from its current baseline.
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29 (proposes that APRA develop an internal
system for tracking all relevant information concerning regulated entities).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to APRA for action.
APRA is currently implementing an Electronic Document Management System.
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30 (proposes that APRA develop mechanisms
to investigate the reinsurance arrangements for general insurers on a
random but frequent basis).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to APRA for action.
APRA largely complies with this recommendation already. In addition,
it has proposed in its discussion paper, ‘Prudential Supervision
of General Insurance – Stage 2 reforms’, that insurers include
additional information about their reinsurance arrangements in the Reinsurance
Management Strategy (REMS) they must already lodge with APRA.
APRA is currently reviewing comments it has received from industry on
this proposal.
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31 (proposes that the effectiveness
of the current memorandum of understanding (MOU) between APRA and ASIC
be reviewed; that the processes for liaison, coordination and exchange
of information between APRA and ASIC be reviewed on a regular basis; and
that, to facilitate the exchange of information, the Commonwealth Government
should make a regulation specifying ASIC for the purposes of s.56(5)(a)
of the
APRA Act).
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The Government progressed amendments to the
APRAAct last year to enhance the exchange of information between APRA
and ASIC.
APRA’s cooperation and sharing of information with other financial
sector supervisory agencies (including ASIC) is governed by the APRA Act.
Responsibility for reviewing the MOU between APRA and ASIC was referred
to APRA for its action. Consultations between APRA and ASIC are progressing.
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32 (proposes that matters relating
to the co-ordination of Commonwealth regulation affecting the insurance
industry be the province of the Commonwealth Treasury).
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Treasury continues to facilitate ongoing liaison
and coordination between regulators.
The Government appointed Treasury as a member of the Council of Financial
Regulators (the Council) in 2003. The Council’s membership already
included the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) (Chair), APRA and ASIC.
The Council’s ultimate objectives are to contribute to the efficiency
and effectiveness of regulation and to promote stability of the Australian
financial system.
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33 (proposes that coordination of matters
related to the regulation of the insurance industry be addressed through
the proposed ministerial council).
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Refer to recommendation 54 (below).
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34, 35, 36 (propose greater public
disclosure of financial information by APRA and/or insurers).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to APRA for action.
In response, APRA’s discussion paper, ‘Prudential Supervision
of General Insurance – Stage 2 Reforms’, proposes a number
of options regarding information that APRA and/or insurers should consider
releasing.
APRA is currently reviewing comments it has received from industry on
the options presented in the paper.
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37 (proposes that APRA identify which
regulatory activities should be disclosed publicly and by what means).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to APRA for action.
APRA is continuing to develop guidelines for disclosure of APRA’s
regulatory activities, in consultation with ASIC.
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38, 39 (propose that APRA use current
supervisory powers and standards for the regulation of authorised insurers
that operate as part of a corporate group, pending development and promulgation
of a standard for such regulation).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to APRA for action.
APRA is already using its powers in this area.
APRA is developing a regime of consolidated supervision where authorised
insurers operate as part of a group. This will be the subject of a separate
consultation paper.
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40 (proposes that APRA take steps to
ensure that it effectively exchanges with relevant foreign regulators,
information and intelligence on the operations of Australian insurers
with international operations).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to APRA for action.
New MOUs have been signed with the Financial Services Authority (UK)
and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
APRA is continuing to consult other overseas regulators in Germany, Singapore
and France.
APRA’s cooperation and sharing of information with other financial
sector supervisory agencies (including foreign regulators) is governed
by the APRA Act.
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41 (proposes that APRA modify the prudential
standards to require the annual production by an authorised general insurer’s
Approved Actuary of a report on the overall financial condition of the
insurer).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to APRA for action.
APRA’s discussion paper, ‘Prudential Supervision of General
Insurance – Stage 2 Reforms’, proposes the creation of a new
prudential standard that would require an Approved Actuary to prepare
a Financial Condition Report similar in concept to that already required
for submission to APRA by Appointed Actuaries to life insurers.
APRA is reviewing comments received from industry in response to this
proposal.
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42 (proposes that the Commonwealth
Government amend the Insurance Act 1973 to extend prudential regulation
to insurance-like products, to the extent possible within constitutional
limits).
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The Government commissioned Mr Gary Potts,
a former Executive Director of the Commonwealth Department of the Treasury,
to examine the role of discretionary mutual funds in the insurance market,
and that of direct offshore foreign insurers. Mr Potts provided his report
to the Government at the end of January 2004.
The Government intends to implement all of the recommendations of the
Potts Review.
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43, 44 (propose that the Commonwealth
Government amend the Corporations Act to extend the grounds upon which
APRA may apply for the winding-up of authorised general insurers, and
to specify that courts may have regard to the interests of policyholders
in determining such applications).
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The Government accepted this recommendation,
which is being considered by both Treasury and APRA.
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45 (proposes that the ASX amend Listing
Rule 3.1 or publish a guidance note making it clear that price sensitive
announcements have the approval of either the board or a delegate of the
board, subject to ratification by the board).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to the ASX for consideration.
ASX Guidance Note 8 to Listing Rule 3.1 currently indicates that a director
or executive officer who becomes aware of information must immediately
consider whether that information should be given to the ASX, and that
an entity cannot delay giving information to the ASX pending formal sign-off
or adoption by the board. This is consistent with the continuous disclosure
obligation.
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46 (proposes that the ASX amend the
Listing Rules to prohibit blacklisting of analysts).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to the ASX for consideration.
To ensure that implementation of this recommendation does not detract
from the primacy of the continuous disclosure obligation, the ASX has
amended Guidance Note 8 – Continuous Disclosure: Listing Rule 3.1 to include
discussion of this issue specifically. (It is important that the Rules
not endorse briefing for analysts where they are given information not
available to the wider market).
More generally, conflicts of interests of financial services licensees
are addressed in CLERP 9, which will also be supplemented by an ASIC Policy
Statement.
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47, 48 (propose that the ASX clarify
Listing Rule 11.1 so that it applies to any significant change in the
business or assets of a listed company, whether it be by acquisition,
disposal, amalgamation or otherwise; amend the Listing Rules to define
significant change, so that it encompasses financial and geographic factors
as well as the nature and scale of the company’s business; and amend rule
11.2, so that it applies to any disposal of the whole or substantially
the whole of the assets or operations of a listed company).
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The Government referred these recommendations
to the ASX for consideration.
ASX Guidance Note 12 – Change of Activities has been substantially revised
to incorporate these issues.
In addition, the Insurance Act 1973 has been amended to require
court approval for transactions involving any disposal of the whole or
substantially the whole of the assets or operations of a listed company.
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49 (proposes that APRA become the sole
prudential regulator of general insurance).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to the States and Territories for their consideration.
A majority of States and Territories for which this recommendation is
relevant have given in-principle support; in some cases, this support
has been expressed subject to conditions.
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50 (proposes that if the States and
Territories remain involved with prudential regulation, that there be
effective information exchange with APRA).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to the States and Territories for their consideration.
A majority of States and Territories have expressed general agreement
with this recommendation.
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51, 52 (propose that the States and
Territories reduce inconsistencies in their statutory schemes, and apply
relevant prudential requirements to government insurers and statutory
fund schemes).
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The Government referred these recommendations
to the States and Territories for their consideration.
A majority of States and Territories for which this recommendation is
relevant have indicated support for examining the impact of inconsistencies
in statutory schemes.
A majority of States and Territories considered that only prudential
standards relevant to the operation of a government authority should be
applied to statutory fund schemes.
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53 (proposes that the States and Territories
consider allowing greater price flexibility in their statutory schemes,
and progress this through the proposed Ministerial Council or like arrangement).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to the States and Territories for their consideration.
The States and Territories expressed mixed views on this recommendation.
Several considered that their statutory schemes provide sufficient pricing
flexibility, whilst others do not support this recommendation.
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54 (proposes that the Commonwealth
use a ministerial council or like arrangement to discuss and resolve issues
relating to general insurance matters).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to the States and Territories for their consideration.
A majority of States and Territories have endorsed the continuation of
the Ministerial Meeting on Insurance Issues forum as the appropriate arrangement
to implement this recommendation.
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55 (proposes that the States and Territories
abolish stamp duty on general insurance products).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to the States and Territories for their consideration.
A majority of the States and Territories do not support this recommendation.
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56 (proposes that those States and
Territories that have not already done so, abolish fire services levies
(FSL) on insurers).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to the States and Territories for their consideration.
A majority of States and Territories advise that they are reviewing or
have abolished the FSL.
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57 (proposes that States and Territories
should exclude the cost of the GST for the purposes of calculating stamp
duties or any other State/Territory imposed levies on insurance premiums).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to the States and Territories for their consideration.
A majority of the States and Territories do not support this recommendation.
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58 (proposes that all governments avoid
imposing levies and taxes on insurers that cannot be passed on to policyholders).
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The Government referred this recommendation
to the States and Territories for their consideration.
A majority of the States and Territories do not consider it necessary
to support this recommendation.
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59, 60 (propose that the Income
Tax Assessment Act 1936 be amended to align it with the modified accounting
standards proposed; and the law be amended to make contributions to catastrophe
reserves tax deductible and releases assessable for tax).
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Australia remains committed to adopting international
accounting standards and considers it appropriate to await consideration
by the IASB of arrangements for catastrophe reserves to examine the behavioural
impacts arising from any new model, before aligning the taxation treatment
of general insurers with their accounting treatment.
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61 (proposes that the Commonwealth
Government introduce a policyholder protection scheme where insurance
companies fail).
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The Government commissioned Professor Kevin
Davis to conduct a technical study of Financial
System Guarantees (announced on 12 September 2003).
As foreshadowed at the time, the Government intends to conduct a broader
consultation process before making a final decision on this matter.
The Government has released the Davis Report and invites public submissions
on the key issues and policy questions contained in the Government Discussion
Paper on Financial System Guarantees.
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